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In perfectly competitive markets, prices aggregate inputs and outputs into a money
metric that allows production plans to be ranked by their profitability.  When informational
asymmetries in competitive markets lead to adverse selection, prices in these markets assume
an additional role that conveys information about product quality.  In the case of banking
production, quality is linked to risk because prices are linked to credit quality.  
The problem of efficiency measurement is complicated by the additional role because
quality varies with price and price is a decision variable of firms operating in these markets.
The effect of these endogenous components of prices on financial performance is illustrated
with a production-based model and a market-value model that generate “best-practice”
frontiers.  Unlike the standard profit function’s frontier, these frontiers are not conditioned on
prices so that they compare the financial performance of firms with different quality-linked
prices.  Hence, they identify the most efficient pricing strategies as well as the most efficient
production plans.
These two alternative models for measuring efficiency are employed to study the
efficiency of highest level bank holding companies in the United States in 1994.  The
contractural interest rates these banks obtain on their loans and other assets are shown to
influence their expected profit, profit risk, market value, and efficiency.1Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) provide extensive reviews of
this literature in the field of banking.
2Given a technology for producing outputs, y, with inputs, x, represented by the transformation
function,T(y,x)# 0, which satisfies certain regularity conditions, and given the output prices, p, and
input prices, w, the profit function, B(p,w), results from maximizing (p@ y - w@ x)  with respect to all
technically feasible production plans, {y,x} 0 T(y,x)#0 .
3See, for example, Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993), Akhavein., Berger, and
Humphrey (1997), and Ferrier, Grosskopf, Hayes, and Yaisawarng (1993).
Introduction
The production efficiency of firms is often measured by fitting an upper-envelope
profit function or a lower-envelope cost function to firms’ price and production data.  The
envelope function controls for the prices that each firm faces and represents the best observed
practice in the sample at these prices.   Each firm’s inefficiency is gauged by its distance from
the best-practice frontier.  This distance measures the amount by which a firm’s profit could
be increased or its cost reduced if its production constituted "best  practice."  A variety of
parametric and nonparametric techniques are available for computing the frontier.
1  
This strategy for measuring efficiency  assumes that firms maximize profit given
competitively determined prices of inputs and outputs.
2   Conveying information about relative
scarcities, these prices aggregate inputs and outputs into a money metric that allows
production plans to be ranked by their profitability.  The assumption of profit maximization
implies that the "best-practice" production plans are, in the ideal,  technically  efficient, that
is to say, they are located on the boundary of the set of inputs required to produce any given
set of ouputs. In addition, profit maximization requires that "best-practice" plans be
allocatively efficient, which is to say that, out of all technically efficient plans, the allocatively
efficient plans maximize profit at their given prices.   Various techniques have been used to
decompose a firm’s overall inefficiency, measured by its distance from the best-practice
frontier, into  technical and allocative components.
3  In this framework for measuring
efficiency, the role of input and output prices is to aggregate production plans into a money
metric that permits their ranking by relative efficiency or, equivalently, by their respective
distances from the best-practice frontier.
However,  when the competitive markets that determine these prices experience the
types of informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers that lead to adverse selection,
prices take on an additional role in the production process.  Not only do they serve as
aggregators of inputs and outputs into a money metric, but they also convey information about
how markets ameliorate the asymmetry.  For example,  in financial markets where borrowers4See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
5The standard profit frontier is computed by estimating the profit function, B(p,w), using a
composed error term.  One component of the error term is two-sided and captures statistical noise
while the second component is one-sided and gauges each observation’s distance from the noise-
corrected frontier.  This distance, or lost profit, is interpreted as "inefficiency."  See Jondrow, Lovell,
Materov, and Schmidt (1982).
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are better informed about their credit risk than lenders and where borrowers are suspected of
misrepresenting their riskiness to lenders, prices may not serve the simple role of equilibrating
demand and supply.
4   Lenders seeking higher quality credit applicants may charge lower
interest rates that result in excess demand for credit.  In turn, they ration credit to applicants
they perceive to be less risky.  Lenders that charge higher interest rates attract riskier
applicants on average, since the less risky applicants seek out lenders charging lower rates.
Hence, in financial markets prices not only serve to aggregate inputs and outputs into a money
metric, they also indicate risk.  Lenders that charge higher interest rates expect greater profit
but also greater risk.
A. Endogenous, Quality-Indicative Prices
This example illustrates that in competitive markets characterized by these types of
informational asymmetries, prices may have an endogenous component that results from the
process of ameliorating the informational problems.  This endogenous component is linked
to the quality of the product.  In choosing the quality of their outputs and inputs, producers in
these competitive markets are simultaneously establishing the endogenous components of their
output and input prices.  In financial markets, the contractural interest rates that lenders charge
determine the credit quality of their loan applicants and, hence, reflect the lenders’ risk-return
choices.  The link between price and quality also applies to input markets.  For example, in
labor markets where potential employees are better informed about their productivity than
employers, employers who pay higher wage rates will attract more productive applicants than
employers offering lower wage rates.  Thus, producers operating in competitive output and
input markets where prices are linked to quality must solve a more difficult production
problem than producers operating in markets having no significant informational asymmetries.
The critical question that the price-quality link poses for efficiency measurement is
how to account for the effects on efficiency of choosing the endogenous components of prices.
The standard frontier profit and cost functions treat prices in their entirety as exogenous.
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Since they measure "best practice" given the endogenous components of prices, their measures3
of inefficiency do not include inefficiency due to suboptimal choices of quality linked to price.
To illustrate this point, consider two lenders with different loan pricing strategies who are
each, given their own prices, equally efficient relative to the "best practice" frontier. 
However, if one of the two loan pricing strategies is more profitable than the other, the profit
lost because of one lender’s use of a less profitable pricing strategy is not included in the
standard profit function’s measure of the lender’s inefficiency, since the "best-practice"
frontier is conditioned on the quality-linked component of price.  Capital markets, however,
will punish the lender’s choice of a suboptimal pricing strategy by reducing the lender’s
market value.
B. Maximizing Market Value with Quality-Linked, Endogenous Prices
The market value of a firm is the discounted value of its expected cash flows.  The
discount rate depends on the firm’s exposure to systematic risk.  Hence, in markets where
prices are linked to quality, firms  that employ  suboptimal pricing strategies diminish their
expected cash flows and reduce their market values.  When, as is the case in financial markets,
the quality-linked component of price is also associated with the risk involved in lenders’ cash
flows, it influences the market value of the firm through its effect both on expected cash flows
and on the discount rate applied to those profits.  The link between prices and risk and, hence,
between prices and the discount rate applied to expected profit is not taken into account by the
standard profit and cost functions and by the efficiency analysis based on their frontier
formulations.
The introduction of risk into the analysis requires that feasible production plans and
price environments be linked with conditional probability distributions of profit.  The standard
profit and cost functions assume that firms’ managers rank production plans, given
competitively determined prices, by the first moments of their implied subjective conditional
distributions.  When risk is introduced into the analysis, higher moments of the distribution
can affect the rankings of production plans and, when prices have endogenous components,
the ranking of production plans and feasible price schedules.   In the absence of agency
problems,  managers’ rankings of production plans and price schedules reflect discounted cash
flows or, in other words, their assessment of the effect of feasible plans and prices on their
firms’ market values.   In contrast, the standard profit function ranks production plans, given
the prices of inputs and outputs, simply by their  expected current-period cash flow.
Since future production plans are not observed, relying on the current period’s plan
to proxy future cash flows may be the best alternative.  However, risk and its effect on the4
discount rate applied to the cash flows would seem to be essential elements to take into
account in measuring efficiency, since they affect the firm’s market value.  Ignoring risk in
measuring efficiency can be justified when a firm’s exposure to market-priced risk is
independent of its choice of production plan and when all firms in the efficiency comparison
group have the same exposure to market-priced risk.  However, in many, if not most,
production contexts, a firm’s choice of production plan influences the degree of systematic and
idiosyncratic risk to which it is exposed.  Hence, it affects both the firm’s expected cash flows
and the discount rate applied to those profits.  Changes in a firm’s production plan that
improve its efficiency, measured by the difference between its expected profit and the "best-
practice" level of  profit, do not necessarily lead to an increase in the firm’s market value,
since these changes influence the discount rate on cash flows as well as the cash flows.  If
these changes in production increase market-priced risk so that the discount rate is also
increased, their effect on the firm’s market value will depend on the relative magnitudes of the
increase in profit and in risk and its related discount rate.  Thus, reorganizing production to
reduce profit inefficiency does not necessarily increase the firm’s market value when risk is
also increased.
Accounting for the market-priced risk of production in gauging  efficiency differences
among firms is a general problem not peculiar to the phenomenon of risk-indicative prices.
Efficiency measurement can ignore market-priced risk when it is invariant to the firm’s
production decisions and affects all firms under analysis equally.  However, when firms face
a schedule of risk-indicative prices, their choices of prices and production plans are likely to
generate important differences among them in terms of risk and, to the extent that capital
markets price these differences, important differences in market value.  
To allow for the possibility that firms operate in markets where informational
asymmetries link  prices and quality and to allow for the possibility that differences in risk in
general and risk associated  with the price-quality schedule in particular influence production
decisions and market value, two generalizations of the standard frontier profit function used
to measure firms’ ineffficiency differences are proposed and illustrated in the sections that
follow. 
C. Generalizing Efficiency Measurement to Account for Quality-Indicative Prices
  The first approach, developed by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995,1996) and
Hughes and Moon (1995), relies on a managerial utility function that ranks production plans
and endogenous price schedules based on managers’ beliefs about the likelihood of future6When the parameter restrictions implied by profit maximization are imposed on the system
of share equations generated by the Almost Ideal Demand System, they become identical to the
standard translog profit function and share equations.  Although the Almost Ideal Demand System is
based on a translog specification, another flexible functional form can be easily substituted into its
structure.
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economic states of the world and how those states interact with production plans and
endogenous prices to generate profit.  Hence, their managerial utility function, defined over
production plans and endogeous prices, implies a ranking of subjective probability
distributions of profit that are conditional on the production plans and price schedules.
Managers choose their most preferred plan subject to feasibility conditions.  Hughes, Lang,
Mester, and Moon (1995,1996) use the Almost Ideal Demand System to obtain functional
forms to estimate the utility-maximizing system of share equations that includes a share
equation for profit.  Their formulation is sufficiently general to allow for rankings of
production plans that take into account higher moments of the implied subjective conditional
distributions of profit.  Hence, the resulting production system that is estimated  allows for the
possibility that risk influences production decisions.
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 Hughes and Moon (1995) show that the Almost Ideal Demand System can be
employed not just to recover managers’ preferences for production plans but also their
preferences for expected return and for return risk.  Using the estimated system of share
equations, they obtain measures of predicted return on equity and return risk for each firm
(U.S. commercial banks) in their sample.  In turn, using stochastic frontier estimation
techniques, they obtain a "best-practice," upper-envelope, risk-return frontier for their sample.
They measure a firm’s inefficiency at its measured level of risk as the difference  between the
"best-practice" return and the firm’s observed (noise-corrected) return.  Hughes and Moon
(1995) argue that this measure of inefficiency is priced by capital markets, and they show  that,
for a sub-sample of publicly traded firms, their measures of expected profit and the profit risk
(their transformed measures of the expected return on equity and return risk) explain 96
percent of the variation in the market value of the firms’ equity.  Their technique of measuring
efficiency applies the stochastic frontier estimation not to the profit function, which is
conditioned on prices, but to the predicted profit and risk so that the resulting measure of
inefficiency takes into account sub-optimal choices of quality-linked prices.  
The second generalization of efficiency analysis focuses not on firms’ choices of
production plans but on their market value and their failure to achieve "best-practice" market
value.  Developed by Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997), this technique involves7See Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) for a discussion of using book value adjusted
to remove goodwill as a proxy for replacement costs.
8The frontier can also be computed using firms’ market value of shareholders’ equity and their
adjusted book values of equity.  Using assets rather than equity to measure inefficiency allows for the
possibility that there are agency problems that result in a transfer of value from debtholders to
equityholders through asset substitution.  See Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) on this point.
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estimating a stochastic frontier or an upper-envelope curve of the market values of firms’
assets given the book values of their assets, adjusted to remove goodwill.  The  adjusted book
value of a firm’s assets is a proxy for their replacement cost while the market value represents
how well the firm has exploited market opportunities and has organized production.
7  The
upper envelope of market values defined over adjusted book values gives the highest, or "best-
practice," market value for any given book-value investment in assets.
8  A firm’s inefficiency
is measured by the difference between the frontier market value evaluated at the adjusted book
value of the firm’s assets and the firm’s observed market value.  This difference represents the
efficiency  both of business strategies and of production practices as well as the market
advantages the firm might enjoy.  The extent to which it is necessary to separate market
advantages that the firm has created from those that are purely exogenous to the firm’s skill
depends on the problem under consideration.  
The market-value frontier has the advantage of incorporating the market’s assessment
of the entire stream of firms’ expected cash flows, not just its current-period expected profit.
It also incorporates the market’s assessment of the relevant discount rate to apply to each
firm’s expected cash flows.  Hence, its evaluation of efficiency fully encompasses the firm’s
business strategies, pricing policies, and organization of production, as well as the market
advantages the firm exploits.
In the sections that follow, these two approaches are described and applied to
commercial banking to illustrate the effects of banks’ pricing strategies on expected profits,
risk, market value, and efficiency measured both by the production model and by the market-
value model.  Commercial banking, as the examples cited earlier imply, is characterized by
informational asymmetries that make prices, that is, interest rates on loans and on uninsured
borrowed funds, sensitive to credit quality.9This approach draws on earlier work by Hughes (1989, 1990) on hospitals and education that
allows managers to choose production plans that trade net income for other objectives.
10Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996) contend that banking scale economies
measured from the standard cost function fail to control for the effects on cost of scale-related changes
in the quality of output.  If an increase in scale improves a bank’s diversification, it allows the bank
to achieve a higher expected return at the same level of risk, since it permits the bank to substitute at
the margin better diversfication for costly risk management.  The bank may respond to this improved
return on risk-taking by taking more risk at the larger scale.  If the increased risk-taking is costly, it
may mask the scale economies in risk management that are expected from scale-related
diversification.  In fact, most studies that measure scale economies using the standard approach find
essentially constant returns overall and slightly decreasing returns at large banks.  Using their
alternative framework that controls for output prices as well as other quality characteristics that could
vary with scale, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996) find evidence of large economies of
scale that increase with bank size, a result that suggests that the current merger wave is not exhausting
potential scale economies.  
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II. The Most Preferred Production System
Using a managerial utility function defined over production plans and endogenous
prices, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995,1996) derive constrained, utility-maximizing
demands for profit and for inputs.
9  These demand functions are conditioned on the level of
equity capital, outputs, and endogenous prices.   In their estimation of the production system,
they add a first-order condition for equity capital.   Although the utility-maximizing outputs
and endogenous prices can also be obtained, they condition the utility maximization problem
on these variables to facilitate its empirical implementation.  Conditioning on outputs allows
scale economies to be calculated while conditioning on the endogenous components of prices
holds these quality characteristics of production constant so that the interpretation of scale
economies is not blurred by changes in quality.
10  
If, in its empirical implementation, this alternative framework controls for prices in
their entirety, it might seem to offer no advantages over the standard profit function in
measuring efficiency when prices are quality-sensitive.  Nevertheless, as Hughes and Moon
(1995) have adapted it, it can more easily accommodate quality-sensitive prices than the
standard frontier profit and cost functions because it gauges efficiency, not directly from the
profit function, which is conditioned on prices, but from a stochastic envelope fitted to
performance measures derived as predictions of the profit function.  Hence, their profit
function is fitted to firms’ data as an average relationship, not as an envelope.  These
performance measures, each firm’s predicted profit and the standard error of its predicted
profit, both normalized by equity capital (i.e., its rate of return on equity and the prediction11Barnett, Hughes, and Moon (1995) employ this formulation to model the salaries of three
types of  secondary school staff: instructional staff, supporting staff, and administrative staff.  They
regress salary on factors such as experience, assignments, and training, and they use the constant term
to proxy the "base."
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risk of its return), are conditioned on prices.  Hence, they account for the profitability and risk
that result from firms’ choices of the endogeous components of prices.  However, the
stochastic upper envelope of predicted return, given prediction risk, is not conditioned on
prices.  It represents the highest predicted return over all observed prices at any given level
of risk.  It does not, then, control for prices in fitting the frontier.
A. Banking Technology
Banking technology can be characterized in terms of financial intermediation.  Banks
employ inputs, x, which are labor and physical capital, as well as borrowed funds and equity
capital, k, to produce outputs, y, which are investments in government securities and in
information-intensive loans.  To allow for the possibility that the prices of inputs and outputs
contain an endogenous, quality-sensitive component, their prices can be written in the
composite form,  where  is a risk-free rate of  interest  and quality is gauged pi ' ¯ pi/q
y
i ¯ pi
by   and  where  is a "base" price
11  and  the quality  premium 0 ñ q
y
i ï1 wj ' ¯ wj q
x
j ¯ wj
is    These quality-sensitive components of prices,  can be interpreted q
x
j ë1. q ' (q y, q x),
as  ex ante proxies for quality.  The amount of nonperforming assets, n, can be used to gauge
ex post quality. Banking technology can be represented by the transformation function,
T(y,x,q,n,k) # 0 .
These prices, (p,w), aggregate inputs and outputs into profit:
(1) pBB ' p@y % m & w@x
where m denotes noninterest income, pB is the price of a real dollar of after-tax accounting
profit, B, in terms of nominal, before-tax dollars, and pB = 1/(1!t), where t is the marginal tax
rate on profit and a real dollar is assumed equal to one nominal dollar.  Thus, pBB is nominal,
before-tax accounting profit, which differs from nominal, before-tax economic profit, pBA, by
the required return on equity capital, wk k,
(2)
p ' p % wkk
' p@y % m & w@x.9
B. Managerial Utility
Hughes and Moon (1995) argue that including the production plan and its quality
characteristics in the managerial utility function, U(B,y,x,q,n,k), rather than expected profit and
the standard deviation of profit, leads to a more general specification of managerial
preferences since it does not preclude the possibility that higher moments of the distribution
of profit could affect preferences.  This utility function represents managers’ beliefs about the
probabilities of future states of the world and about how production plans and quality
characteristics,  (y,x,q,n,k), interact with those states, s, to yield a realization of profit, B =
g(y,x,q,n,k,s).  If we represent those beliefs about the likelihood of future market conditions
by a subjective probability distribution of s, the beliefs about how profit follows from the
interaction of  states and production plans, summarized in g(@ ), can be combined with the
subjective distribution of s to generate a conditional, subjective probability distribution for
realized profit, f(B;y,x,q,n,k).  Hence, defining utility as a function of the production plan and
its quality characteristics is equivalent to defining it as a function of these subjective
conditional probability distributions,  f(@ ).  Of course, the production plan (y,x,q,n,k) implies
an expected profit,   and a level of risk measured by E(B;y,x,q,n,k) '
m
[f(B;y,x,q,n,k)B]dB
the standard deviation S(B;y,x,q,n,k), but the utility function defined over  (B,y,x,q,n,k) allows
higher moments of the distribution to affect the ranking.
C.  The Most Preferred Production Plan
The managers' most preferred, feasible production plan maximizes managerial utility:
(3)      U ( B ,x;y ,q ,n ,k )
B ,x
(4) s.t. p@y % m & w@x & pBB ' 0
(5) T(x;y,q,n,k) # 0,
where   and pi ' ¯ pi/q
y
i wj ' ¯ wj q
x
j .
Denoting the price vector by  the solution to (3)-(5) gives the most v / ( ¯ p, ¯ w,q,pB),
preferred production plan: the utility-maximizing input demands,  x(y,q,n,v,m,k), and the
utility-maximizing level of profit, B(y,q,n,v,m,k).  Since the profit function is conditioned on10
the level of equity capital, it can be normalized by capital to obtain the most preferred rate of
return on equity. 
D.  Deriving the Most Preferred Production Plan from the Almost Ideal Demand System
Because the organization of production is described in terms of managers’ ranking
production plans and choosing their most preferred plans, it follows that recovering their
preferences and technology from data can be accomplished using the techniques of demand
analysis.   In particular, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995, 1996) adapt the Almost Ideal
Demand System, developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),  to accommodate managerial
preferences.  Rather than express preferences in terms of the utility function, it employs its
dual representation, the expenditure function. Formulated to represent managerial preferences,
the expenditure function gives the minimum expenditure on the "goods," profit B and inputs
x, necessary to achieve some minimum level of utility, conditional on the values of ouputs,
output quality, and equity capital: 
                                                                  (6)
min w@x % pBB
B,x
                                                                                        (7) s.t. U 0 & U(B,x;y,q,n,k) ' 0
                                                                           (8) T(x;y,q,n,k) # 0
The solution to (6)-(8) gives the constant-utility demand functions.  When these demand
functions are substituted into (6), the expenditure function E(y,n,v,k,U
0) is obtained.  Since the
expenditure minimization problem is the dual of the utility maximization problem (3)-(5), the
maximum utility obtained from the expenditure (p·y+m) is U* while the minimum expenditure
required to achieve U
0  =
  U* is (p·y+m).  Consequently, E(y,n,v,k,U
0) = (p·y+m). 
In adapting the expenditure function to represent managerial preferences and to
accommodate the availability of price data for bank holding companies, it is necessary to





Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon substitute  where r is a risk-free rate of ( # p,r) for (p, ¯ p),
interest.  Their specification of the expenditure function is 
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When Shephard’s lemma is applied to the expenditure function, the constant-utility
demands for inputs and profit are obtained.  These demands are readily converted to the
utility-maximizing demands, expressed as shares of profit, pBB, and of inputs, w·x in
expenditure, p·y+m,  by inverting the expenditure function and substituting the resulting
indirect utility function,
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Since these share equations are conditioned on equity capital, they can be readily
divided on equity capital to obtain a predicted rate of return on equity.  However, for such
purposes as computing scale economies, it is necessary to add a first-order condition that
defines the optimal level of capital.  This condition can be derived by adding a second stage
to the optimization in (3)-(5).  Beginning with the conditional indirect utility function, which
can be obtained by evaluating the Lagrangean function for (3)-(5) at the optimum,
(13)
V(y,q,n,v,m,k) / U(B(@),x(@);y,q,n,v,k)
% 8(@)[p@y % m & w@x(@) & pBB(@)]
% ((@)[T(x(@);y,q,n,k)],





















% 6[ln(p@y % m) & ln P] ' 013
which gives the condition,
(14)
D % Dkkln k % Rpkln # p % j
j
(jkln yj % j
s
Tskln ws % 0Bkln pB % Jrkln r
% hnkln n % 6[ln(p@y % m) & ln P] ' 0.
The system of equations  estimated consists of the profit share equation (12), the input share
equations (11), and the first-order condition (14).  Adding-up, homogeneity, and certain
symmetry conditions are also imposed on the estimation.  See Hughes, Lang, Mester, and
Moon (1995, 1996) for details. 
Just as the estimation of a consumer demand system recovers consumers’ preferences
for goods and services from price and expenditure data, the estimation of the  Most Preferred
Production System recovers managers’ preferences for expected profit and production plans
from price and revenue data.  Consumer demand systems are often estimated using cross-
sectional data to minimize the problem of changing tastes.  Since managers’ preferences are
formed from their beliefs about how production plans interact with probable future economic
conditions to generate profit and from their beliefs about how probable these future conditions
are, the Most Preferred Production System is also estimated using cross-sectional data to
minimize the problem of changing beliefs and, hence, changing rankings of production plans
and price schedules.
E.  Deriving Expected Return and Return Risk
Hughes and Moon (1995) demonstrate that the preferences for expected profit and for
production plans that are recovered from estimating the Most Preferred Production Plan can
be transformed into preferences for subjective, conditional probability distributions of profit.
They employ the fitted profit share equation (12) to obtain a measure of expected profit,
E(pBB), by multiplying the predicted profit share by (p@ y + m).  Since the profit share equation
is conditioned on equity capital, predicted profit can in turn be divided by equity capital to
compute the  expected rate of return on equity, E(pBB/k).  To proxy the risk attached to
expected profit and the expected return on equity, Hughes and Moon (1995) use the standard
error of the predicted profit share.  Since they do not impose homoskedasticity on their
estimation, the resulting variance-covariance matrix allows for a nonconstant error variance
across all observations in the sample.  The error variance will differ as individual bank’s
production data  and choices differ since the predicted profit share depends on (y,q,n,v,m,k).12Lower level bank holding companies--that is, holding companies owned by the highest level
companies--are not included individually to avoid double counting them.  Moreover, their business
strategies are likely to depend on the strategy of the highest level company that owns them.
14
Hence, the standard error of the predicted profit share captures how prediction risk depends
on each observation’s particular economic circumstances and production decisions.
Multiplying  the standard error of the predicted profit share  by   (p@ y +m) gives the standard
error of predicted profit, and dividing by equity capital yields the standard error of the
predicted rate of return on equity.  These standard errors are used as proxies for risk, the
second moment of the subjective distributions of profit, conditioned on the production plan
and price schedule.  Hughes and Moon (1995) argue that this strategy for gauging risk captures
market-priced risk.  Using 1994 data on highest level bank holding companies
12  in the United
States, they demonstrate that these measures of expected profit and profit risk explain 96
percent of the variation in the market value of banks’ equity.
F. Measuring Efficiency in Expected Return-Risk Space
Using their measures of each observation’s expected return on equity,   E(pBB/k), and
the standard error of the predicted return,   S(pBB/k), which are functions of (y,q,n,v,m,k),
Hughes and Moon estimate a stochastic, upper envelope of predicted return, given its
prediction risk:
(15) Ei (pBB/k) ' '0 % '1Si (pBB/k) % '2Si (pBB/k)2 % ,i.
A composite error term, ,i = < i ! u i,  distinguishes inefficiency from statistical noise.  The
two-sided component, <i, distributed N(0,F
2
v),  accounts for any unmeasured randomness in
the data generation process of risk and return while the one-sided component, ui > 0, is
distributed half normally, N(0,F
2
u), and gauges inefficiency.  Hence, inefficiency is  the noise-
corrected distance of an observation’s expected return from the best-practice return at its
measured level of prediction risk.
The log-likelihood function of this best-practice frontier is 
















where N is the number of observations and M(@) is the standard normal cumulative distribution13For details of this procedure, see Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982).
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function.  The frontier is estimated by maximum-likelihood techniques.  The frontier obtained
by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) and by Hughes and Moon (1995) is shown in
Figure 1.  The empirical example that follows is based on the estimated production system
of these two papers.
A bank’s inefficiency is measured by the difference between its noise-adjusted
expected return and the best-practice frontier value of expected return.  This difference is given













denotes the conditional expectation of ui given ,i .
13   This value represents the bank’s return
lost to inefficiency or the failure to attain "best practice."  When the return inefficiency is
multiplied by equity capital, it measures profit inefficiency, the lost expected profit due to
inefficiency.  
II. Market Value and the Most Preferred Production System
The measures of return and profit inefficiency obtained from the Most Preferred
Production System account for prediction risk but are not directly linked to market value.  To
demonstrate that these measures of inefficiency are priced by capital markets, Hughes and
Moon (1995) estimate the equation, ln(market value of equity) = "0 + "1ln(E(pBB/k)) +
"2ln(S(pBB/k), and show that it explains 96 percent of the variation in the market value of
equity.  Hence, given a firm’s observed level of prediction risk, an increase in its expected
profit (or return) moves it closer to the "best-practice" frontier, reduces its inefficiency, and
increases its market value.  However, because these measures are not directly linked to market
value, they do not anwer the question, "What is the optimal expected return-risk point on the
"best-practice" frontier that maximizes a firm’s market value?"
A. Market-Value Frontiers
Rather than derive performance measures from a production model, Hughes, Lang,
Moon, and Pagano (1997) turn directly to market values and examine differences between
market values and replacement costs, proxied by book values.  They estimate a "best-practice"14Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) find evidence that equity capital serves as a signal
of a firm’s riskiness.  In particular, if we control for asset size, inefficient banks with higher capital-to-
asset ratios  increase market-value efficiency by reducing leverage and increasing asset quality while
inefficient banks with lower capital-to-asset ratios increase market-value efficiency by increasing
leverage and reducing asset quality. 
15See Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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market-value frontier given book value and measure market-value inefficiency as the
difference between a firm’s observed market value and the "best-practice" value.  They relate
market-value  inefficiency to production decisions by regressing it on the production plan and
variables characterizing the firm’s economic environment.
14
A firm’s managers who act in the interests of the firm’s shareholders maximize the
value of their equity claims.  When there are no agency problems, maximizing the market
value of the firm’s equity is equivalent to maximizing the market value of its assets.  In a
multi-period setting, the current market value of the i-th firm’s assets, MVAi,0 , is given by 
(18)











where E(CFEi,t  ) is the i-th firm’s expected cash flow paid to its shareholders at time t while
E(CFDi,t  ) is the expected cash flow paid to debtholders at time t.  The required return on
equity for the i-th firm is ki and  ri gives the required return on debt.  The first term on the
right-hand side represents the market value of equity, and the second term, the market value
of debt. 
Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) recommend measuring  inefficiency using
the market value of assets rather than of equity since agency problems that lead to such
problems as asset substitution can result in shareholders’ expropriating  market value from
debtholders.
15  In such a case, the gain in the value of the equity may be more than offset by
the fall in value of the debt. To capture the inefficiency caused by the agency problems, it is
necessary to estimate the frontier on the market value of assets rather than equity.
A firm’s market-value inefficiency represents in principle the amount of market value
the firm fails to produce, given  the replacement cost of its assets.  This difference between the16See Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996).
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observed market value and the “best-practice” value could be due to inherent market
advantages as well as managerial skill.  To proxy replacement costs, it is necessary to subtract
goodwill from book value since it is a component of market value.
16  The “best-practice”
market-value frontier is obtained, following the procedures described in (15)-(17), by
estimating the relationship,
    MVAi =  0 +   1 BVAi +   2 (BVAi)
2 +  i ,                                            (19)
where BVAi is the book value of assets adjusted to remove goodwill and, as explained above,
,i = <i ! ui .
B. The Effects of Quality-Indicative Prices on Financial Performance
The market-value frontier (19) and the production-based risk-return frontier (15) are
both sufficiently general to incorporate differences in quality-indicative prices into their
efficiency measurement since they are not derived from regressors that are prices.  In contrast
to the standard profit frontier obtained by regressing profit on prices, the market-value frontier
is found by regressing market value on replacement cost while the production-based frontier
is derived by regressing predicted return on prediction risk.  Since each of these frontiers is
computed using a different set of regressors, they are not directly comparable.  Nevertheless,
the importance of accounting for endogenous prices in efficiency measurement can be
underscored by asking how endogenous prices affect profitability, risk, market value, and
different efficiency metrics, controlling for the other components of the production plan.
To explore the question of how quality-indicative prices affect financial performance,
measures of financial performance are borrowed from the estimated market-value frontiers of
Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) and from the estimated production system and risk-
return frontier of Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996).  The production-based measures
describe the financial performance of 441 highest-level bank holding companies (BHCs) in
the United States in 1994.  The market-based measures belong to a subsample of 190 publicly
traded BHCs.  The full sample ranges in size from $32.5 million to $249.7 billion in
consolidated assets while the publicly traded sample spans $159.0 million to $249.7 billion.
The data used to estimate the production model are described in the Appendix and summarized
in Table 1.  17See Section I.B.
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The profit-share equation (12) is used to obtain each BHC’s predicted profit,
E( ;y,x,q,n,k), and its profit risk, S( ;y,x,q,n,k), the standard error of its predicted profit.  The
risk-return frontier derived from these estimates gives each BHC’s inefficiency stated in terms
of lost expected return on equity (return inefficiency) and in terms of lost (dollars of) expected
profit (profit inefficiency).  The market-value frontiers are estimated both for the market value
of assets relative to the adjusted book value of assets and for the market value of equity
relative to the adjusted book value of equity (adjusted to remove goodwill).  These two
measures of inefficiency give each BHC’s lost market value of assets and of equity.
The estimated production model recovers managers’ preferences for production plans
and for quality-indicative prices from the data and translates them into preferences for
expected profit, E( ;y,x,q,n,k), and profit risk, S( ;y,x,q,n,k).
17  In turn, the market-value
equation (18) indicates that  expected profit and profit risk play a role in valuing equity and
assets.  To the extent that the production model’s expected profit captures the market’s
expected current cash flow and proxies the market’s expected future cash flows and to the
extent that profit risk proxies the market’s assessment of the risk that gives the required return
on equity, expected profit and profit risk should explain the market value of equity.  Thus,
each BHC’s choice of quality-indicative prices should influence the market values of its equity
and its assets and, hence, its market-value efficiency.  
To quantify the influence of quality-indicative prices, the following system of
equations is estimated using a  sample of 190 highest-level BHCs that are publicly traded:
(20)
ln (Market value of equity) ' "0 % "1 ln (Expected profit) % "2 ln (Profit risk)
ln (Expected profit) ' $0 % $NZ
ln (Profit risk) ' (0 % (NZ .
where  Z = (y,x,q,n,k).  In addition, four measures of inefficiency--return and profit
inefficiency from the production model and asset- and equity-based market-value inefficiency
--are regressed on Z:
       ln (Inefficiency)  =  00    +    0 @ Z .                                                      (21)19
The results of these estimations are reported in Table 2.
The data used to estimate market values are obtained from the stock-price database of
the Center for Research on Securities Prices and from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database.
Balance-sheet and income-statement data are taken from the FRY-9 Financial Statements for
1994. The output vector,  y, in Z = (y,x,q,n,k) consists of the book-value of assets adjusted to
remove goodwill, expressed in log form, and the book value of various balance-sheet and off-
balance-sheet products, expressed as ratios of total assets.  These specific products are listed
in the first column of Table 2.  The category "Liquid Assets" comprises cash, balances due,
federal funds sold, reverse repurchase agreements, and government securities.  "Other Assets"
includes assets held in trading accounts and investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries.
"Derivatives" is the notional amount of activities in futures, options, and swaps.  The capital
component, k, in the capital-to-assets ratio is the book value of shareholders’ equity.  The
nonperforming assets component, n, of the nonperforming assets ratio is the sum of accruing
and nonaccruing loans, leases, and other assets  past due more than 90 days plus gross charge-
offs.  Including gross charge-offs eliminates any differences among banks in their
aggressiveness in charging off past-due assets. 
The input vector, x, in Z = (y,x,q,n,k) consists of ratios to total assets of labor
(measured by the number of full-time, equivalent employees), physical capital (given by the
book value of premises and fixed capital), uninsured domestic deposits, all other domestic
deposits, and other borrowed funds (foreign deposits, federal funds purchased, repurchase
agreements, commercial paper, subordinated debentures, mandatory convertible securities,
trading account liabilities, mortgage indebtedness, and other borrowed funds).
In the context of financial intermediation, the prices of most outputs and of uninsured
borrowed funds are likely to reflect credit quality.  For the purpose of specifying q, the
endogenous components of prices, it is assumed that, when banks set the contractural prices
on their outputs, they establish the credit quality of their customers.  On the other hand, while
the prices of uninsured borrowed funds reflect banks’ choices of output prices and the
resulting credit quality of those outputs, it is assumed that banks do not directly set these input
prices.  Hence, only output prices are included in q.  As in Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon
(1996), the output prices must be measured by an asset-weighted, average contractural price,





not available.  The exogenous component of the average price is the risk-free Treasury bill
rate, which does not vary across BHCs.  Hence, the endogenous component of the average
price can be proxied by the weighted average price. 18The coefficient estimates for the two half-samples are available from the author.
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Estimating the relationships in (20) and (21) gives the effects of the endogenous
components of output prices on financial performance, which are presented in the second row
of Table 2.  An increase in the average contractural return on assets of 0.01 increases expected
profit by 8.28 percent, but this improvement in profitability entails a 12.056 percent increase
in profit risk.  The market value of equity increases  5.295 percent.  In comparing the effect
of the increase in endogenous prices on the four measures of inefficiency, some caution is
necessary since the production-based and market-value frontiers are derived from different
regressors.   Nevertheless, the signs of all four measures of inefficiency indicate that an
increase in the contractural return reduces inefficiency; however, only the coefficient on ROE
inefficiency, the distance from the production model’s risk-return frontier, is statistically
significant.  If the sample is divided into the more and less efficient halves, a distinct
difference in significance levels arises between the two halves.  For the more efficient half, the
coefficients on the two production-based measures of inefficiency are significantly negative
while those on the two market-value measures are insignificantly negative.  For the less
efficient half, the coefficients on profit inefficiency and on the two market-value measures are
all significantly negative while only the coefficient on return inefficiency is insignificantly
negative.
18  Thus, banks’ choices of endogenous output prices affect their market values, and
the market-value measures of inefficiency indicate that these choices also affect their relative
market performance compared with their peers of similar size.  
By controlling for output prices in their entirety, the standard profit frontier eliminates
the influence of these effects on its measure of inefficiency.  Moreover, because it abstracts
from issues of profit risk, the standard profit frontier’s measure of inefficiency may not be a
good proxy  for the impact on market value of differences in firms’ production plans.
Although an increase in the average contractural return on assets tends to increase market
value by increasing expected profit, it tends to diminish market value  by increasing profit risk.
In the example at hand, an increase in return of 0.01 results in a statistically significant gain
of 13.39 percent in market value through its effect on expected profit while it leads to a
statistically significant loss of 8.10 percent in market value through its effect on profit risk. 
In addition to the influence of quality-linked prices on financial performance, the
effects of the production plan on financial performance deserve comment.  First, the
composition of assets and liabilities significantly affects expected profit, risk, and market
value but does not generally explain efficiency differences among BHCs.  A notable exception21
to this generalization is the effect of derivatives activity.  Its level adversely affects expected
profit and market value and significantly increases all four measures of inefficiency.  The poor
performance of derivatives products may be due to the Federal Reserve’s surprising increase
in interest rates in February 1994.
An increase in asset size appears to increase expected profit more than proportionately
while it increases profit risk, the market value of equity, and profit inefficiency
proportionately.  If the book-value of equity increases with the book-value of assets less than
proportionately, market-value inefficiency and return inefficiency should be reduced.  The
coefficients on these measures confirm this hypothesis.
An increase in the capital-to-assets ratio increases expected profit, reduces profit risk,
and improves market value; however, the magnitudes are important.  An increase of 0.01 in
the capital-to-assets ratio increases the market value of equity 0.046, or 4.6 percent.  However,
for capital-to-asset ratios less than 0.22, the increase in the book value of equity  implied by
an increase of 0.01 in the capital ratio is greater than 4.6 percent.  None of the BHCs in the
sample had a capital-to-assets ratio that high.  Hence, increases in the capital-to-assets ratio
reduce market-value efficiency and return inefficiency.  The signs of the coefficients on these
measures confirm this interpretation, although the coefficients on the market-value measures
are not statistically significant.
 
III. Conclusions
In perfectly competitive markets, prices aggregate inputs and outputs into a money
metric that allows production plans to be ranked by their profitability.  When informational
asymmetries in competitive markets lead to adverse selection, prices in these markets assume
an additional role that conveys information about product quality.  In the example of banking
production, quality is linked to risk.  The problem of efficiency measurement is complicated
by the additional role because quality varies with price and price is a decision variable of firms
operating in these markets.  The effect of these endogenous components of prices on financial
performance has been illustrated with a production-based model and a market-value model
that generate “best-practice” frontiers.  Unlike the standard profit function’s frontier, these
frontiers are not conditioned on prices so that they compare the financial performance of firms
with different quality-linked prices.  Hence, they identify the most efficient pricing strategies
as well as the most efficient production plans.22
 Appendix
 Data Used to Estimate the Most Preferred Production System
To estimate the system of  share equations, (11) and (12), and the first-order condition,
(14), Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon (1996) define the system’s variables as follows.  They
specify five outputs in the vector, y: liquid assets, short-term securities, long-term securities,
loans and leases net of unearned income, and other assets.  Inputs include the level of financial
capital, k, and the vector, x, consisting of labor, physical capital, insured domestic deposits,
uninsured domestic deposits, and other borrowed money.  Asset quality is measured by the
amount of nonperforming assets, n, which are accruing and nonaccruing loans, leases, and
other assets past due over 90 days.  Input prices, w, are computed by dividing expenditure on
each input by its quantity.  The contractual price of an output is measured by the ratio of
income accruing to the output to the quantity of that output that is accruing interest. Because
data are not available to compute individual prices, a weighted average price,





income, which is income not due to the components of y.   These variables are measured as
averages over the four quarters of 1994.  
The state tax rates are taken  from The Book of the States, published by the Council of
State Governments, and from Significant Aspects of Fiscal Federalism, published by the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.23
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FIGURE 1.  Risk-Return Frontier of U.S. BHCs (1994) 26
Table 1.  Data Summary
                           Mean        Std Dev        Minimum        Maximum 
Total Assets       12,257,270,210 30,989,407,110 159,002,000     249,745,000,000 
Market Value of Assets 12,822,500,000  31,512,800,007   155,108,250    249,287,000,000 
Market Value of Equity        1,148,052,392    2,371,303,769        6,321,250      16,287,400,000 
Book Value of Equity               946,240,768    2,343,272,632      10,308,000      18,891,000,000
Liquid Assets Ratio*     0.33810        0.10304        0.14593        0.75797 
Business Loans Ratio    0.11731       0.071063      0.0069277        0.45039 
Agricultural Loans Ratio   0.0074396       0.014537        0.00000        0.12562 
Individual Loans Ratio   0.10454       0.060524      0.0011106        0.36190 
Real Estate Loans Ratio     0.32004        0.11214      0.0049880        0.64177 
Other Loans Rattio    0.020611       0.017929        0.00000        0.12402 
Leases Ratio         0.0068320       0.011830        0.00000       0.084528 
Other Assets Ratio    0.035612       0.057550       0.010517        0.60479 
Equity Capital Ratio         0.084983       0.015936       0.044244        0.13540 
Credit Guarantees Ratio              0.21091        0.17009       0.023081        1.27942 
Derivatives Ratio             0.32284        0.57121       0.023081        5.46773 
Labor Ratio               0.00048880     0.00014879     0.00014976      0.0019616 
Physical Capital Ratio               0.016741      0.0056562      0.0028259       0.035027 
Uninsured Domestic Deposits              0.057475       0.035292      0.0023887        0.31163 
Other Domestic Deposits                 0.69690        0.13098       0.085367        0.93471 
All Other Borrowed Funds                  0.11447        0.12794     0.00039370        0.85313 
Average Contractural Return on Assets  0.075487      0.0072123       0.050603        0.12252 
Nonperforming Assets Ratio        0.010255       0.010226      0.0016704       0.097385 
*All ratios are expressed in terms of total assets.Table 2. Coefficient Estimates
(Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
#Tested against 1 and not significantly different,  +Tested against 1 and significantly different at the 10% level, ++at the 5% level, and +++at
the 1% level.)
Ln(market value) =  -0.7840** + 1.6174***Ln (expected profit)  - 0.6718***Ln (profit risk)        R
2 = 0.958
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(30.600)Table 2. Coefficient Estimates (Continued)
(Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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2 0.998 0.982 0.958 0.717 0.957 0.409 0.391